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Two Orders of Things:
Wittgenstein on Reasons and Causes
MATTHIEU QUELOZ
Philosophy, University of Basel
This paper situates Wittgenstein in what is known as the causalism/anti-causalism
debate in the philosophy of mind and action and reconstructs his arguments to
the effect that reasons are not a species of causes. On the one hand, the paper aims
to reinvigorate the question of what these arguments are by offering a historical
sketch of the debate showing thatWittgenstein’s arguments were overshadowed by
those of the people he influenced, and that he came to be seen as an anti-causalist
for reasons that are in large part extraneous to his thought. On the other hand,
the paper aims to recover the arguments scattered inWittgenstein’s own writings
by detailing and defending three lines of argument distinguishing reasons from
causes. The paper concludes that Wittgenstein’s arguments differ from those of his
immediate successors; that he anticipates current anti-psychologistic trends; and
that he is perhaps closer to Davidson than historical dialectics suggest.
ABSTRACT
1. Introduction
Whenwe act, we seem to simultaneously inhabit two orders of things. Muchof what we do is guided, justified and explained by what we believe and what
we desire. We do what we do because we have reasons to do it, reasons which or-
chestrate the movements of our minds as much as the movements of our bodies.
And yet our bodies know nothing of those reasons. The cascades of events in our
limbs and brains obey not the inferential force of reasons, but the physical force of
causes. Therefore, the standard story goes, reasons and causes must be intimately
connected if reasons are not to pull us in one direction while causes push us in the
other; the reasons for doingwhatwe domust concurrently cause the corresponding
bodily movements if we are to act on them at all. The two orders must really be
one.
Against this, Wittgenstein maintained that reasons and causes were ‘two dif-
ferent orders of things’,1 and it has been taken to be one of his guiding insights
from the 1930s onwards that ‘reasons must be distinguished from causes’.2 This
1 LudwigWittgenstein,Wittgenstein’s Lectures: Cambridge 1932-35 (Oxford: Blackwell, 1979), 4.
2 P. M. S. Hacker,Wittgenstein: Mind and Will: Volume 4 of an Analytical Commentary on the
Philosophical Investigations (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), 160; Hans-Johann Glock,
AWittgenstein Dictionary (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 1996), ‘causation’; Severin Schroeder,
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pits Wittgenstein firmly against a number of views rallied around the doctrine of
causalism, which, inspired by the Davidsonian dictum that ‘reasons are causes’,3
currently forms the orthodoxy in the philosophy of action. At the heart of this
causalist orthodoxy are the following two theses:
(CR) Causalism about reasons: the reason for which someone performs an action is the
cause of the action, where reasons are standardly conceived of as mental states or events.
(CE) Causalism about intentional explanation: explanations of actions by reference to reas-
ons are causal explanations, just like explanations of physical events.
According to this ‘standard story’,4 reasons are mental states (or events, such as the
onset of mental states) which play a dual role: they both rationalise and cause the
bodilymovementswe call actions.On this view, the distinction between reasons and
causes seems amere red herring. Consequently,Wittgenstein’s discussion of reasons
and causes hast lost currency in a climate of opinion dominated by causalism.
In recent years, however, anti-causalist reactions to the standard story have given
rise to ‘a new debate about the nature of our reasons for acting’.5,6 The new anti-
causalists are said to be ‘somewhat sympathetic with the writings of Wittgenstein
and those he inspired’.7,8 Yet the refractions undergone byWittgenstein’s own argu-
‘Wittgenstein’,A Companion to the Philosophy of Action, Timothy O’Connor and Constantine
Sandis (eds.), (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 556.
3 Donald Davidson, ‘Actions, Reasons, and Causes’, Essays on Actions and Events (Oxford: Clar-
endon Press, Oxford University Press, 2001), 17.
4 Michael Smith, ‘The Structure of Orthonomy’,Agency and Action, John Hyman and Helen
Steward (eds.), (Cambridge: CambridgeUniversity Press, 2004), 165; Frederick Stoutland, ‘Reas-
ons and Causes’,Wittgenstein: Mind, Meaning and Metaphilosophy, Pasquale Frascolla, Diego
Marconi, and Alberto Voltolini (eds.), (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), 57.
5 Maria Alvarez,Kinds of Reasons: An Essay in the Philosophy of Action (Oxford: Oxford Uni-
versity Press, 2010), 2.
6 The following collection gives an overview of the debate: Guiseppina D’Oro and Constantine
Sandis (eds.), Reasons and Causes: Causalism and Anti-Causalism in the Philosophy of Action
(New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013).
7 Julia Tanney, ‘Reasons as Non-Causal, Context-Placing Explanations’,New Essays on the Ex-
planation of Action, Constantine Sandis (ed.), (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), 94.
8 Recent anti-causalist accounts include: Maria Alvarez,Kinds of Reasons: An Essay in the Philo-
sophy of Action (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010); Rüdiger Bittner,Doing Things for
Reasons (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001); Jonathan Dancy, Practical Reality (Oxford
and New York: Oxford University Press, 2000); P. M. S. Hacker, ‘Agential Reasons and the
Explanation of Human Behaviour’,New Essays on the Explanation of Action, Constantine
Sandis (ed.), (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009); George Frederick Schueler, Reasons and
Purposes: Human Rationality and the Teleological Explanation of Action (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2003); Severin Schroeder, ‘Are Reasons Causes? AWittgensteinian Response
to Davidson’,Wittgenstein and Contemporary Philosophy of Mind, Severin Schroeder (ed.),
(New York: Palgrave, 2001); Frederick Stoutland, ‘Reasons and Causes’,Wittgenstein: Mind,
Meaning and Metaphilosophy, Pasquale Frascolla, DiegoMarconi, and Alberto Voltolini (eds.),
(New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010); Julia Tanney, ‘Reasons as Non-Causal, Context-Placing
Explanations’,New Essays on the Explanation of Action, Constantine Sandis (ed.), (New York:
Palgrave Macmillan, 2009).
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ments or by those he inspired in the course of this debate have rendered it difficult
to evaluate his contribution to it. Arguments inspired by Wittgenstein are, after
all, not the same as arguments taken over fromWittgenstein, and since arguments
inspired byWittgenstein may not always be inspired arguments, onemight well ask
whether the tributes are beneficiary to the assessment of his views. Anti-causalists
since G.E.MAnscombe often appeal toWittgenstein, yet equally often fail to en-
gage with the details of Wittgenstein’s own position, while their views still differ
in important respects from his. As a result, the relevance of his writings to current
anti-causalist work in the philosophy of action is hard to assess.
This paper aims to fill this lacuna. It situatesWittgenstein in the causalism/anti-
causalismdebate andreconstructs his arguments showing that reasons arenot causes.
The paper aims (i) to reinvigorate the question ofwhat these arguments are by show-
ing that historically, Wittgenstein’s arguments were overshadowed by those of his
successors, and that he is classified as an anti-causalist for reasons extraneous to these
arguments; (ii) to recover three of Wittgenstein’s own arguments distinguishing
reasons from causes. The paper concludes that these arguments differ from those of
Wittgenstein’s immediate successors; that he anticipates anti-psychologistic trends;
and that he is closer to Davidson than historical dialectics suggest.
2. Wittgenstein’s Place in the Debate
A look at the history of the causalismdebate serves tomotivate and contextualise the
present investigation: to what extent does Wittgenstein deserve the contemporary
label of anti-causalist, and to what extent has he been driven into the anti-causalist
corner by circumstances extraneous to his thought? I shall argue in this section
that his refutation of the causal conceptions of the will prevalent before he wrote
served to establish him as an anti-causalist in one sense, while the rise of teleolo-
gical approaches to intentional explanation, epitomised by those of his followers
which became the targets of Davidsonian causalism, retroactively drove him into
the anti-causalist camp in another sense. A rough historical sketch of the debate
between variants of causalism and anti-causalism therefore goes some way towards
explainingWittgenstein’s classification as an anti-causalist, thereby reinvigorating
the question of how and to what extent this classification can be grounded in his
own writings.
Part of the intellectual background toWittgenstein’swritings on action are three
successive currents of thought which try to elucidate the concept of an agent: an
entity not merely passively caught up in a network of causes and effects, but which
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actively contributes to what happens. The three currents share a common strategy.
They all seek to identify somemental accompaniment in virtue of which a ‘mere
happening’ turns into a voluntary action.
The first and perhaps the most important current to have shaped the tradition
that Wittgenstein was reacting against is constituted by empiricist theories of the
will. On empiricist accounts, bodily movements are identifiable as actions in virtue
of their connection to another part of experience, namely ‘volitions’, or acts of the
will. Actions are bodily movements caused by volitions. An emblematic formula-
tion of such a theory is found in thewritings of John Locke, but this type of account
goes back at least to Thomas Hobbes and René Descartes, and was developed in
much the same vein by David Hume, Jeremy Bentham and John Stuart Mill. As
Locke’s influential formulation has it, willing is ‘an act of the Mind’, accessible
through introspection, ‘directing its thought to the production of any action, and
thereby exerting its power to produce it’.9 On this account, the will is a ‘Thought
of myMind’, an element of experience which causes the action.
Second came transcendental theories of the will, inspired by Arthur Schopen-
hauer, which denied that the will is an experience and ‘located the real agent beyond
experience’.10 According to Schopenhauer, the act of will and the act willed are ‘one
and the same thing perceived and apprehended in a twofold manner’, namely in
‘inner apprehension’ or ‘self-consciousness’ as the ‘real act of will’, and in ‘outer
perception, in which the body stands out objectively, as the action of the body’.11
The third and last current to shape the climate of opinion in which Wittgen-
stein was writing was marked by a return to empiricist accounts of volition. It
attempted to explain voluntary action by appealing to kinaesthetic sensations and
images thereof. The chief exponent of this type of view was William James. In
his ‘ideo-motor theory’, it is the ideas of kinaesthetic sensations left by involun-
tary movements which then enable one to bring about voluntary action.12 All that
needs to precede the action to make it voluntary is the bare idea of the kinaesthetic
sensations corresponding to the movement. Whether the action then ensues is not
a psychological matter anymore, but a physiological one: ‘The willing terminates
with the prevalence of the [motive] idea’.13 Bertrand Russell seems to have sub-
scribed without qualification to James’s view,14 arguing in The Analysis of Mind
9 John Locke,An Essay Concerning Human Understanding (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2009), II.xxi.28.
10 Hans-Johann Glock,AWittgenstein Dictionary (Oxford: Blackwell, 1996), ‘will’.
11 Arthur Schopenhauer, The World as Will and Representation (New York: Dover, 1966), 36.
12 William James, The Principles of Psychology (New York: Dover, 1950), 492f.
13 Ibid., 560.
14 P. M. S. Hacker,Wittgenstein: Mind and Will: Volume 4 of an Analytical Commentary on the
Philosophical Investigations (Oxford: Blackwell, 1996), 548.
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that sensations and images ‘with their causal laws’ yield ‘all that seems to be wanted
for the analysis of will, together with the fact that kinaesthetic images tend to cause
the movements with which they are connected’.15
Wittgenstein turns against all three currents of thought. He denies that there is
a need either to think of the will as a cause that is part of experience or to postulate
other causes such as invisible acts of will or kinaesthetic sensations.16 According
to him, ‘there is not one common difference between so-called voluntary acts and
involuntary ones’, such as the ‘presence or absence of one element’.17 Instead, what
marks out an action as voluntary is, on the one hand, its context, its ‘character and its
surroundings’,18 and, on the other hand, the abilitiesmanifested by the agent, such
as moving or refraining from moving on demand,19 saying whether one moved
voluntarily,20 not being surprised by how one has moved,21 and predicting one’s
behaviour without observation.22 Voluntary actions are ‘movements with their
normal surroundings of intention, learning, trying, acting’.23 As far as the subject of
voluntary action is concerned, therefore, it is fair to say thatWittgenstein did much
to entrain the demise of causalism – though not single-handedly. He was joined
in the enterprise by his contemporary Gilbert Ryle. It was Ryle, for instance, who
influentially pointed out that if acts of volition were themselves supposed to be
voluntary, a volition was required to set in motion a volition, and an infinite regress
ensued.24 ButWittgenstein andRyle are unanimous in dismissing the accountof vo-
lition dominant in their day as ‘a causal hypothesis, adopted because it was wrongly
supposed that the question, ‘What makes a bodily movement voluntary?’ was a
causal question’.25 Through their joint refutation of causalist theories of volition,
they ushered in an anti-causalist era.26
15 Bertrand Russell, The Analysis of Mind (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1921), 285.
16 JohnHyman, ‘Action and theWill’,The Oxford Handbook of Wittgenstein, Oskari Kuusela and
Marie McGinn (eds.), (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2011), 459.
17 Ludwig Wittgenstein, The Blue and Brown Books: Preliminary Studies for the Philosophical
Investigations (Oxford: Blackwell, 1958), 151–52.
18 LudwigWittgenstein, Zettel (Oxford: Blackwell, 1981), §587.
19 Ibid., §595.
20 Ibid., §597.
21 Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations (Chichester, U.K.: Wiley-Blackwell, 2009),
§628.
22 Ibid., §631. See also P. M. S. Hacker,Wittgenstein: Mind and Will: Volume 4 of an Analytical
Commentary on the Philosophical Investigations (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), 586;
Hans-JohannGlock, ‘Wittgensteins LetzterWille. “PhilosophischeUntersuchungen” 611–628’,
Ludwig Wittgenstein: Philosophische Untersuchungen, (Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 2011), 181.
23 Ludwig Wittgenstein, Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology (Oxford: Blackwell, 1980), I,
§776.
24 Gilbert Ryle, The Concept of Mind (London: Routledge, 2009), 54.
25 Ibid.
26 Stewart Candlish and Nic Damnjanovic, ‘Reasons, Actions, and theWill: The Fall and Rise of
TWO ORDERS OF THINGS
YetWittgenstein earned his anti-causalist reputation through his involvement
in quite another debate as well, which concerned not the genesis of action, but its
explanation. Throughout the history of the philosophy of science, the pendulum
had swung back and forth between what, following GeorgHenrik vonWright, one
may call theAristotelian and theGalilean traditions:27,28 in the Galilean tradition,
explanations are causal ormechanical, while in the Aristotelian tradition, they are
teleological or finalistic. The Galilean, causal explanations have their roots in Plato’s
thinking and became dominant in the Renaissance and Baroque sciences, while the
Aristotelian tradition was dominant in theMiddle Ages and was renewed in G.W.F.
Hegel’s thought. Hegel rehabilitated the teleological idea of a law by arguing that a
law should be conceived as an intrinsic connection which makes phenomena tele-
ologically intelligible (as opposed to predictable from knowledge of their efficient
causes) and is grasped through reflective understanding (rather than through induct-
ive generalisation). Against Hegel, the positivists associated with Auguste Comte
and John Stuart Mill argued that teleological explanations were either unscientific
or reducible to causal explanations, an attitude which dominated Enlightenment
methodology. But towards the end of the nineteenth century, anti-positivist and
hermeneutic philosophy of science became prominent again. Thinkers such as Jo-
hann Gustav Droysen andWilhelm Dilthey introduced an influential distinction
between two kinds of explanation: whatDroysen termedErklären on the one hand,
which corresponds to causal explanation, andVerstehen on the other hand, which is
a mode of explanation sui generis, consisting in purpose-oriented, empathic under-
standing.29 A related distinction was drawn by members of the Southwest School
of Neo-Kantianism, such as WilhelmWindelband and Heinrich Rickert: they de-
scribed the natural sciences as being nomothetic, i.e. concerned with general laws,
and the social and historical sciences as being ideographic, i.e. concerned with indi-
vidual cases.30 Yet in the decade between the twoWorldWars, positivism returned,
drawing support from new developments in logic to challenge the hermeneutic
consensus and reinstate the unity of method in the sciences.
It is at this stage that Wittgenstein would have found the debate. To say that
Causalism’, The Oxford Handbook of the History of Analytic Philosophy, Michael Beaney (ed.),
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013).
27 Georg Henrik vonWright, Explanation and Understanding (Ithaca and London: Cornell Uni-
versity Press, 1971), ch. 1.
28 The historical narrative of this and the next paragraph closely follows vonWright’s account in
Explanation and Understanding (1971).
29 Johann Gustav Droysen,Historik: Vorlesungen Über Enzyklopädie Und Methodologie Der
Geschichte (Stuttgart: Fromann-Holzboog, 1977), 22, 150f.
30 Hans-Johann Glock, ‘Reasons for Action: Wittgensteinian and Davidsonian Perspectives in
Historical,Meta-Philosophical andPhilosophicalContext’,NordicWittgenstein Review 3 (2014),
7–46.
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he adopted an entirely anti-causalist position with regard to these issues in the
philosophy of science would, however, be simplistic. His association with the lo-
gical positivists of the Vienna Circle as well as his ‘verificationist phase’31 certainly
complicate the assessment. Abstracting for now from what Wittgenstein had to
say on these topics to look at the historical context in which he thought and wrote,
we can rest content with noting that positivism and causalism about intentional
explanation were the dominant trends in the philosophy of science of the 1930s,
while after Wittgenstein’s death, the tide had turned. In fact, it is clear that Wit-
tgenstein inspired a number of thinkers to question the positivist methodology
in the late 1950s. One such thinker was William Dray, for example, who conten-
ded that understanding history requires rational explanations which show that the
action was appropriate or rational on a particular historical occasion.32 Another
such thinker indebted toWittgenstein was G. E .M. Anscombe, who emphasised
the role of intentionality in understanding actions and argued that the explanation
of intentional action resisted assimilation to explanation by efficient causes and
natural laws, thus constituting an explanationmodel in its own right for history and
the social sciences.33 Finally, Peter Winch appliedWittgensteinian insights to the
social sciences, insisting that behavioural data had to be interpreted in terms of the
concepts and rules determining the social reality of agents, which meant that one
had to come to share those agents’ conceptual framework by participating in their
form of life.34 Thus, leaving open at present the question of whatWittgenstein did
to bring about this state of affairs, we can conclude that hewas preceded by causalist
trends in the philosophy of science as well as in the theory of action, and that, at
least in the theory of action and in the philosophy of social science, anti-causalist
movements trailed in his wake.
But in the 1960s, the tide turned once more. Carl Gustav Hempel argued in
his 1961 presidential address to the American Philosophical Association that inten-
tional explanation did not, after all, differ logically from causal explanation; and in
1963, Donald Davidson published his extraordinarily influential ‘Actions, Reasons
and Causes’.35 With this paper, Davidson joined Hempel in ‘swimming against
a very strong neo-Wittgensteinian current of small red books’,36 the red-bound
31 RayMonk, Ludwig Wittgenstein: The Duty of Genius (London: RandomHouse, 1991), 288.
32 William Dray, Laws and Explanation in History (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1957).
33 G. E. M. Anscombe, Intention (Oxford: Blackwell, 1957).
34 Peter Winch, The Idea of a Social Science and Its Relation to Philosophy (London: Routledge,
1958).
35 Donald Davidson, ‘Actions, Reasons, and Causes’, Essays on Actions and Events (Oxford: Clar-
endon Press, Oxford University Press, 2001).
36 Donald Davidson, ‘Hempel on Explaining Action’, Essays on Actions and Events (Oxford: Clar-
endon Press, Oxford University Press, 2001), 261.
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titles in the series Studies in Philosophical Psychologywhich includedworks by Peter
Geach,37 AbrahamMelden,38 and Anthony Kenny,39 and which championed tele-
ological approaches to action. TheWittgensteinian consensus hadbeen that reasons
could not be a species of causes. One of the arguments underlying this conviction
was advanced, amongst others, byMelden, who argued that reasons were logically
connected to the action they were a reason for. OnMelden’s account, this barred
them from being causes, since, as the received view had it, causes were essentially
logically independent from their effects.40 As Davidson summarised the prevalent
rationale: ‘Since a reason makes an action intelligible by redescribing it, we do not
have two events, but only one under different descriptions, while causal relations
(in the Humean sense) demand two distinct events’.41 But by distinguishing events
from how we describe them, Davidson was able to overturn this Wittgensteinian
consensus. He proposed two influential theses which set the terms for the ensuing
debate: (i) actions are bodily movements that are caused by a primary reason, which
is a combination of a belief and a pro-attitude;42 (ii) intentional explanations of
actions, which rationalise an action by citing the reason for which it was done, are a
species of causal explanation.43
One of the key features of Davidson’s account is the claim that causation is
an extensional relation between events conceived of as concrete particulars, which
means that it holds independently of how these events are described. In virtue of
its extensionality, therefore, the causal relation can hold between two events even
if those events are referred to under logically connected intentional descriptions.
On this view, one event can both cause and rationalise another event. But the first
event will cause the second only if they have physical descriptions that instantiate a
strict physical law, and the first event will rationalise the second only if they have
appropriately conceptually connected intentional descriptions. This Davidsonian
account soon rose to become the new orthodoxy.
The historical dialectics that emerge from this sketch of the debate’s history
indicate that Wittgenstein’s role in it has, deservedly or not, been that of an agent
of anti-causalism. His refutation of causal conceptions of the will established him
as an anti-causalist in one sense, while the rise of hermeneutic approaches to in-
tentional explanation fuelled by those who claimed him as a source of inspiration
37 Peter Geach,Mental Acts. Their Content and Their Objects (London: Routledge, 1957).
38 Abraham IrvingMelden, Free Action (London: Routledge, 1961).
39 Anthony Kenny,Action, Emotion and Will (London: Routledge, 1963).
40 Abraham IrvingMelden, Free Action (London: Routledge, 1961), 52–53.
41 Donald Davidson, ‘Actions, Reasons, and Causes’, Essays on Actions and Events (Oxford: Clar-
endon Press, Oxford University Press, 2001), 13–14.
42 Ibid., 12.
43 Ibid., 3.
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retroactively associated him with anti-causalism in quite another sense. If a look
at the debate’s history reveals that Wittgenstein either subscribed to or inspired
anti-causalist positions in the various historically relevant senses of the term, it does
not tell us whether that label is legitimately applied to him in the sense pertinent to
the current debate. Doubts have been voiced recently about whether the distance
betweenWittgenstein and Davidson is as great as the historical dialectics suggest.44
A reevaluation of the arguments that really are to be found inWittgenstein’s work
is called for, and it is to this that I now turn.
3. Certainty and First-Person Authority
Why are reasons not a species of causes? One argumentative strand discernible in
Wittgenstein’s writings concerns the different epistemic statuses of causal state-
ments and reason-statements. It is driven by the realisation that ‘strangely enough,
[one] cannot be mistaken about [one’s] reason’:45 while knowledge of the causes
of one’s actions is inductive and hypothetical, knowledge of the reasons is neither.
When, in a law court, someone is asked why she acted as did, she is supposed to
know it. But if reasons were a species of causes, this supposition would seem puzz-
ling – ‘You are not supposed to know the laws by which your body and mind
are governed’.46 So why is the agent nevertheless supposed to know her reasons?
Wittgenstein contemplates the answer a causalist about reasons might give:
Because you’ve had such a lot of experience with yourself? People sometimes say: ‘No-one
can see inside you, but you can see inside yourself’, as though being so near yourself, being
yourself, you know your own mechanism. But is it like that? ‘Surely he must know why he
did it or why he said such and such’.47
Unconvinced, Wittgenstein goes on to point out that reasons often come with an
air of certainty: ‘in an enormous number of cases people give an answer– apodictic –
44 Frederick Stoutland, ‘Reasons and Causes’,Wittgenstein: Mind, Meaning and Metaphilosophy,
Pasquale Frascolla, DiegoMarconi, andAlberto Voltolini (eds.), (NewYork: PalgraveMacmillan,
2010); Nathan Hauthaler, ‘Wittgenstein on Actions, Reasons, and Causes’,Knowledge, Lan-
guage and Mind: Wittgenstein’s Thought in Progress, AntonioMarques and Nuno Venturinha
(eds.), (Berlin and Boston: De Gruyter, 2012); Hans-Johann Glock, ‘Reasons for Action: Wit-
tgensteinian and Davidsonian Perspectives in Historical, Meta-Philosophical and Philosophical
Context’,Nordic Wittgenstein Review 3.
45 LudwigWittgenstein and FriedrichWaismann, The Voices of Wittgenstein: The Vienna Circle
(London and New York: Routledge, 2003), 111.
46 LudwigWittgenstein,Lectures and Conversations on Aesthetics, Psychology and Religious Beliefs:
Compiled fromNotes Taken by Yorick Smythies, Rush Rhees and James Taylor (Oxford: Blackwell,
1966), 21.
47 Ibid.
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and are unshakable about it’.48Where causes are concerned, however, such certainty
is normally out of the question:
The proposition that your action has such and such a cause, is a hypothesis. The hypothesis
is well-founded if one has had a number of experiences which, roughly speaking, agree in
showing that your action is the regular sequel of certain conditionswhichwe then call causes
of the action. In order to know the reason which you had for making a certain statement,
for acting in a particular way, etc., no number of agreeing experiences is necessary, and the
statement of your reason is not a hypothesis. . . . The double use of the word ‘why’, asking
for the cause and asking for the motive, together with the idea that we can know, and not
only conjecture, our motives, gives rise to the confusion that a motive is a cause of which
we are immediately aware, a cause ‘seen from the inside’, or a cause experienced.49
Here as elsewhere, ‘motive’ is used interchangeably with ‘reason’.50 A similar argu-
ment appears inWaismann’s shorthand notes of conversations withWittgenstein:
giving a reason is ‘the description of a singular process, not the specification of a
cause which always involves a whole host of observations. For this reason we say
too that we know the reason for our action with certainty . . . but not the cause of
an act’.51 What is the argument here?
Nathan Hauthaler sees the point as being that ‘agential knowledge regarding
one’s reasons seemed to involve certainty, whereas knowledge about causes seemed
to retain hypothetical or conjectural status’.52 The argument would then runs as
follows:
A can only conjecture the causes of her action.
A knows her reasons for acting with certainty
Therefore, reasons are not causes.
Hauthaler goes on to take issue with this argument by denying that certainty is
the prerogative of reasons. As he points out, Wittgenstein himself avers that we
sometimes know the cause of our actions with certainty – indeed, that this must
be so, because the ‘basic form of the game must be one in which we act’, and since
‘uncertainty could never lead to action’, the ‘primitive form of the language game’
must be certainty.53 In the light of Wittgenstein’s considered opinion, Hauthaler
48 Ibid., 22.
49 Ludwig Wittgenstein, The Blue and Brown Books: Preliminary Studies for the Philosophical
Investigations (Oxford: Blackwell, 1958), 15.
50 LudwigWittgenstein and FriedrichWaismann, The Voices of Wittgenstein: The Vienna Circle
(London and New York: Routledge, 2003), 424.
51 Ibid., 242.
52 Nathan Hauthaler, ‘Wittgenstein on Actions, Reasons, and Causes’,Knowledge, Language and
Mind: Wittgenstein’s Thought in Progress, Antonio Marques and Nuno Venturinha (eds.),
(Berlin and Boston: De Gruyter, 2012), 102.
53 LudwigWittgenstein,On Certainty (Oxford: Blackwell, 1969), §397.
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concludes, ‘certainty and immediacy cannot be maintained as criteria for distin-
guishing reasons from causes of action’.54
As reconstructed by Hauthaler, Wittgenstein’s argument uncomfortably re-
sembles a fallacy described by Stoic logicians, and which Descartes allegedly com-
mitted,55 namely the larvatus or ‘masked man’ fallacy:
A can only conjecture the identity of this masked man.
A knows the identity of her father with certainty
Therefore, this masked man is notA’s father.
Somemaskedman could beA’s father, even thoughA knowswho her father is, but
does not knowwho thismaskedman is. Themaskedman argument constitutes a fal-
lacy because ‘one cannot infer from one’s subjective state of certainty or uncertainty
about two propositions, to the objective connection or lack of connection between
them’.56 OnHauthaler’s reconstruction, it appears that Wittgenstein commits the
masked man fallacy.
However, this is only the case as long as Wittgenstein’s point is held to be that
it is the peculiar ‘air of certainty’57 of reasons which precludes them from being
causes. In fact, a juxtaposition of the passages from the Blue Book with some of
Wittgenstein’s later writings reveals the underlying idea to be quite unlike what
Hauthaler suggests. Certainty concerning one’s reasons for action is, like mathem-
atical certainty, not certainty of a psychological kind.58 The statement that an agent
knows her reasonswith certainty functions rather as the statement that one can only
form hypotheses about the causes of a phenomenon: it is a normative statement
describing the use of the concept, a grammatical statement:
‘One can only surmise the cause of a phenomenon’ (but not know it). – That is a statement
that refers to grammar. It doesn’t say that even with the firmest of intentions we can’t know
the cause. In this respect, the proposition is similar to this: ‘No matter how far we count,
we can’t get to an end of the numerical progression’. And that means: There can be no talk
of an ‘end to the numerical progression’.59
54 Nathan Hauthaler, ‘Wittgenstein on Actions, Reasons, and Causes’,Knowledge, Language and
Mind: Wittgenstein’s Thought in Progress, Antonio Marques and Nuno Venturinha (eds.),
(Berlin and Boston: De Gruyter, 2012), 103.
55 Peter Thomas Geach,God and the Soul (London: Routledge, 1969), 8.
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That one can only surmise the cause should be taken to mean that when it comes
to causes, we ‘want to talk only of ‘surmising’ and not of ‘knowing’, in order to
distinguish cases with different grammars from each other’.60 Analogously, that
one sometimes knows one’s reasons with certainty is not an empirical statement
about the confidence with which people discern their own reasons, but refers to
the grammar of the language game of reason-giving:
It is not important that I know events in my mind, this is not the reason I am asked about
my motives. The reason rather is that here the evidence for and the consequences of the
statement are different sorts of things.61
The point here is that when I am asked about my reasons, the evidence for and
the consequences of the response do not function as they would if someone else
were asked aboutmy reasons. ‘In order to ‘guess another’s reason’, we ‘make use
of [repeated] observation’62 in a way that resembles the identification of causes,
and prolonged observation increases one’s confidence in the judgment, because one
learns which considerations tend to weigh with whom.Moreover, third-personal
reason-attributions may come to be falsified by further evidence, and so resemble
causal statements in terms of consequences as well.
But when a reason-statement ‘is made by the person who is confessing his
motive’,63 we ‘assume that a person knows the motive for his action’.64 Yet to spell
this out merely in epistemological-cum-psychological terms by arguing that the
agent has privileged epistemic access to her reasons – perhaps because they are ‘seen
from the inside’65 – is to model first-personal reason-attributions on the third-
personal case: the evidence for the attributions remains the same – behaviour –
and the consequences of this move in the language game remain qualitatively the
same as well – a description of the agent’s reasons is given, only one with a greater
probability of being accurate and inwhich the agent herself is confident to the point
of certainty. However, as Wittgenstein’s later writings make clear, the agent’s state-
ment of her own reasons is not a description based on behavioural evidence, and the
consequences of the statement are radically different from those of an equivalent
statement by an onlooker:
60 Ibid., 403.
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The criteria for the ‘truthful’ confession that I thought such-and-such are not the criteria
for the description of a past process. And the importance of the truthful confession does
not reside in its rendering some process correctly and certainly. . . . It resides rather in the
special consequences which can be drawn from a confession whose truth is guaranteed by
the special criteria of truthfulness.66
To give one’s reasons is not to describe a past process, and the criteria for success-
fully doing so are not that one’s description accurately renders some independently
specifiable process. First-personal reason-attributions are, in Ryle’s helpful termin-
ology, avowals, as indicated by Wittgenstein’s claim that the criteria are those of
truthfulness. The ‘special consequences’ of first-personal reason-attributions lie in
the fact that a sincere avowal of one’s reasons is decisive in determining what one’s
reasons are – not because the agent has particularly good access to evidence which is
only partially available to others, but because she is granted this authority over what
her reasons are asmatter of grammar: this is how the language game of reason-giving
is played. We ‘call the reason that which [the agent] gives as his reason’.67 It is in
this sense that the thrust of the remark that ‘we assume that a person knows the
motive’ should be taken to be grammatical instead of epistemological – it ‘shows
us how we use the word’.68
What force the argument from certainty has, therefore, derives from and de-
pends on the fact that the agent’s truthful avowal of his reasons is authoritative. The
passages contrasting the fallibility of our knowledge of causes with the infallibility
of our knowledge of reasons should not be read as constituting an independent
argument if they are to have any force. They build on the phenomenon of first-
person authority, and it is therefore under that heading thatWittgenstein’s attempt
to prise reasons apart from causes must be further examined.
If the agent ‘cannot be mistaken in specifying his reason’69 then, this ‘certainty
indicates that specifying a reason is the criterion for having this reason’.70 The
‘reason is what [the agent] specifies’.71 This is subject to the caveat of truthfulness,
but the general point is that what agents claim to be their reasons for action is what
we call their reasons. There is an asymmetry between psychological statements in
the first person present tense andother psychological statements, andwhen it comes
to the question of their reasons for action, agents have particular authority over
66 LudwigWittgenstein, Last Writings on the Philosophy of Psychology (Oxford: Blackwell, 1982),
I, §897.
67 LudwigWittgenstein and FriedrichWaismann, The Voices of Wittgenstein: The Vienna Circle
(London and New York: Routledge, 2003), 111.
68 LudwigWittgenstein, The Big Typescript (Oxford: Blackwell, 2005), 401v.
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(London and New York: Routledge, 2003), 110.
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what these reasons are. If giving one’s reason does not involve finding the cause of
one’s actions by frequent observations, this is because it does not involve finding
anything.
None of the above prevents first-personal reason-statement frombeing defeated
in certain cases: when the agent is insincere, disingenuous, or self-deceived, for in-
stance. But these are derivative cases in which it is only in virtue of thewider context
that a reason-statement can be said to be a case of insincerity or self-deception. The
argument from first-person authority thus boils down to the following:
A can only conjecture the causes of her action.
A knows her reasons authoritatively
Therefore, reasons are not causes.
Does this argument fare better against the charge of committing the larvatus fallacy?
It seems one can construe an argument that exactly parallels the above and yet is
clearly fallacious:
A can only conjecture the identity of this masked man.
A knows the identity of her father authoritatively
Therefore, this masked man is notA’s father.
The masked man might well beA’s father, even though her statement regarding
the masked man’s identity is not authoritative. The problems that afflicted the
argument from certainty seem to carry over to the formulation in terms of first-
person authority.
But to say this is once again to commit the mistake of assuming that first-
person authority about reasons should be explained in epistemological terms. The
authority of first-personal reason-statements does not derive from privileged epi-
stemic access to reasons observed in foro interno. Rather, it is to be explained in
semantic terms: what an agent gives as her reason is what we call her reason, so that
first-personal reason-statements are defeasible logical criteria for the third-personal
reason-attributions. Part of what it means to understand self-ascriptions of reasons
is to be disposed to defer to the self-ascriber – to recognise her authority in the
matter. Among the consequences of first-personal reason statements is the fact that
they are decisive in determining what one’s reasons are. This decisiveness should
be understood not as a causal consequence, but as a normative one: first-personal
reason statements ought to be taken as being decisive, they count as being decisive
and commit the agent to this being her reasons. No such consequences could follow
from the description of inner causal processes that accompanied the action.
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What are the consequences of first-person authority for attempts to identify
reasons with causes? It would appear that any such attempt will need an account
of causation that can accommodate first-person authority about causes. More spe-
cifically, it has been argued – notably by Severin Schroeder – that it requires one to
conceive of causality in a way that allows for the possibility of immediate awareness
of the causes of one’s action.72 In ‘Cause and Effect: Intuitive Awareness’, Wittgen-
stein himself distinguishes several types of causal connection, and he gives examples
of causes of which we are immediately aware: ‘We do use the word in cases where
‘ascertaining the cause’ does not mean making experiments or working with stat-
istics or anything like that’.73 Examples are reactions such as starting at the sight of
something: ‘I start. Someones asks “Why do you start?” – “Because I saw a light
there”’.74
Schroeder claims that if such non-observational knowledge of causation is pos-
sible, first-person authority about the reasons for which one acted does not appear
incompatible with the view that reasons are causes. The argument from first-person
authority can be avoided by resorting to more flexible notions of causality. This
seems contestable, however. For first-person authority about the reasons for which
one acted to be compatible with the view that reasons are causes, it is not sufficient
that immediate awareness bemerely possiblewith regard to both reasons and causes;
in addition, the cases in which the agent is immediately aware of reasons and the
cases in which she is immediately aware of causes must match up. For each case
in which an agent acts for a reason and knows the reason for the action imme-
diately, the same must hold,mutatis mutandis, for the cause of her action. And
while Wittgenstein mentions some cases in which one knows the cause of one’s
action in this way, those remain the exception rather than the rule. Where reasons
are concerned, Wittgenstein’s point is precisely that the case in which the agent
possesses first-person authority is the fundamental one. Cases of mental causality
are not widespread enough to enable the equation of reasons with causes across
the board. Schroeder’s assessment therefore both overstates and underestimates
the force of the argument from first-person authority. It overstates it in claiming
that it succeeds against nomological accounts of causation; and it underestimates it
in failing to appreciate that its force derives both from the idea that first-personal
reason-statements are immune from challenge in a way that causal statements are
not, and from the requirement on cases of immediate awareness to match up.
72 Severin Schroeder, ‘AreReasonsCauses?AWittgensteinianResponse toDavidson’,Wittgenstein
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It may be thought that the asymmetries in authority that set apart reasons from
causes are due to our as yet insufficient understanding of the neurophysiological
processes at issue. Reasons, one might object, are indeed a species of causes, but we
treat the agent’s reason-statement as authoritative for lack of some better indicator
ofwhather reasons in fact are. If onlywehada richerunderstandingof the biological
basis of action and better measuring instruments, we might outdo the agent when
it comes to specifying reasons. ButWittgenstein has a response to this. It consists
in asking what would, for someone who wanted to outdo the agent in specifying
her reasons, count as getting it right:
Let us assume there was a man who always guessed right what I was saying to myself in my
thoughts. (It does not matter how he does it.) – But what is the criterion for his guessing
right? Well, I am a truthful person and I confess that he has guessed right. – But might I
not be mistaken, could my memory not deceive me? And may it not always do so anyway
when—without lying—I express what I have thought withinmyself?—–– But now it does
appear that my knowing ‘what went on within me’ could not be the point at all.75
As this passage makes clear, a person’s ‘confession’ or avowal is not merely a good
indicator of what her reasons are, an indicator whichmight in principle be bettered
by some other measurement technique. In giving one’s reasons, one does not re-
port hidden occurrences or describe independent inner events and processes against
which one’s reason-statements could be verified. If this were the case, others might
in principle develop the means to access that underlying reality and ‘guess one’s
thoughts’, in which case the configurations of that underlying reality would de-
termine whether a description of it ‘got it right’.
But, as Wittgenstein’s example shows, this is not how the language game of
reason-giving functions. Even if there were an observer who guessed one’s thoughts,
and thereby one’s reasons, perfectly, the decisive criterion in the basic case for the
correctness of guesses concerning the agent’s thoughts and reasons would be what
the agent said they were. And with the exception of certain situations that build
on this basic case (e.g. self-deception), there is no room for the possibility of the
agent’s being mistaken. In giving one’s reason for a past action, one does not ‘read
it off from some other process which took place then’76 and which one remembers.
If one did, reason-statements would constitute bona fide descriptions and entail
the possibility of error, of misremembering or misdescribing. But Wittgenstein
wants us to relinquish the idea that the point of giving of one’s reasons is to accur-
ately render some hidden causal processes, past or present. What one does in giving
75 LudwigWittgenstein, Last Writings on the Philosophy of Psychology (Oxford: Blackwell, 1982),
I, §896.
76 LudwigWittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations (Chichester, U.K.: Wiley-Blackwell, 2009),
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someone one’s reasons is to reveal something of oneself, only not ‘on grounds of self-
observation’, but ‘because I want to tell him something aboutmyself, which goes
beyond what happened at that time’.77 One does not report a connection between
reasons and the action they are reason for, but rathermakes a connection.78 The
agent’s statement of her reasons serves expressive rather than descriptive purposes.
When one gives one’s reasons, one does not describe one’s mind, but voices it.79
4. Anti-Psychologism
In the contemporary debate, a prominent strategy against CR is known as anti-
psychologism. It attacks the idea that reasons typically are mental states. Although
anti-psychologism is not normally associated withWittgenstein by contemporary
anti-causalists, this section argues that it is in fact anticipated in his oeuvre.
On causalist accounts, reasons are standardly conceived of as mental states or
events (such as the onset of mental states), in part because they seem well-suited
to play the dual role of rationalising and causing action. But for Wittgenstein, this
notion of reasons as both rationalising and causally efficient inner states or events is
on a par with othermisguidedly hypostasised psychological phenomena.We do not
ask for a description of ‘a hiddenmachine, say, a machine in [the] brain’80 when we
ask for reasons. Wittgenstein’s argument to the effect that reasons are not causally
efficient mental states turns on the idea that even when propositional attitudes
are mentioned in reason-statements, the reason is not the attitude (of believing or
desiring) itself, but the object of the attitude, namely what is believed or desired.
This anti-psychologistic current inWittgenstein’s writings lends itself to being
read in the light of recent objectivist work in the theory of action.Objectivism, in
this context, is the idea that while the agent’s reasons may not be states of affairs the
agent did not believe to or knewnot to obtain, these reasons themselves nevertheless
do not consist in the agent’s believing that p, but rather in what the agent believes,
namely, that p. The tenor of objectivism is that when we act for reasons, we are
not typically engaged in self-reflection, taking a fact about ourselves as our concern.
Rather, the reasons that weigh in one’s reasoning are objective features of the world
rather subjective mental states. For an objectivist, dissociating reasons from causes
then serves the function of freeing reasons from the constraint on causes of action
77 Ibid., §659.
78 Ibid., §486; §§682–83.
79 Ludwig Wittgenstein, Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology (Oxford: Blackwell, 1980), I,
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to be at least partly internal to the agent (and in that sense subjective) if they are not
to involve some puzzling form of causality at a distance.
Perhaps the strongest textual basis for labelling Wittgenstein an objectivist is
the following passage:
If I believe [a] theory after taking clear soup, this is a cause of my belief, not a reason.When
I am asked for a reason for the belief, what is expected, as part of the answer, is what I
believe.81
Another passage that lends support to an objectivist reading is found inWaismann’s
account ofWittgenstein’s philosophy of the early 1930s. Waismann discusses the
position of one who would resist the distinction between reasons and causes by
attributing a dual role tomental states. This recognisably causalist opponent points
out that mental states may well be about something external to the agent, such as a
rule (Waismann’s paradigmatic example of a reason), while the mental state, such as
the agent’s attending to the rule, remains internal to the agent and thus well-placed
to act as a cause of her actions: ‘The knowledge of the rules of arithmetic’, says
the causalist, ‘may be the cause of one’s following these rules in doing a sum’.82
In response, Waismann argues that this trades on an ambiguity between attending
to the rule and what is attended to, namely the rule. The ‘attending to the rule
can indeed be the cause for the rule being followed’,83 but it is what is attended to,
namely the rule itself, which constitutes the reason for the action.
The ambiguity alluded to byWaismann between an act or state on the one hand
and its object or content on the other might justly be said to condense a ‘whole
cloud of philosophy’ into a ‘drop of grammar’.84 The term ‘belief’, for example, is
systematically ambiguous between the believing and the content believed, that is,
between the propositional attitude and the proposition p that forms the object of
that attitude. This is sometimes termed an act-object or a state-content ambiguity.85
The ambiguity is best illustrated using a striking instance of its exploitation in ordin-
ary language that has given rise to philosophical puzzlement, namely the situations
where, as William James put it, ‘faith in a fact can help create the fact’.86 Such self-
verifying beliefs present us with the paradoxical phenomenon of propositions that
81 LudwigWittgenstein,Wittgenstein’s Lectures: Cambridge 1932-35 (Oxford: Blackwell, 1979),
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are made true merely by being believed, and hence seem to come into conflict with
our ordinary assumptions about objectivity – what makes a belief a belief about
states of affairs is ordinarily thought to be precisely the fact that what it is about
holds independently of the belief. Resolving the act-object ambiguity proves key to
dissolving this paradox, as H. H. Price shows in his Gifford Lectures:87 when Virgil
writes of a crew competing in a boat-race: possunt quia posse videntur, ‘they can
because they think they can’,88 it is the attitude of believing that they can win the
race which makes true the proposition believed, namely that they can win the race.
The state of affairs which the belief is about can be seen to be independent of the
proposition believed after all, and the appearance of conflict with the objectivity
condition evaporates.
In view of this ambiguity, it can be granted that we sometimes speak of reas-
ons as beliefs and desires, because the ambiguity of the latter will carry over to the
former. ‘Reason’ becomes likewise ambiguous between the attitude of having a
reason (which makes it somebody’s reason) and the object of the attitude (which
makes it a reason). Indeed, this ambiguity is one of the sources of the temptation to
conflate reasons with causes: if ‘reason’ can be used to refer either to the attitude of
believing that p or to the content believed, both the cause of an action (the agent’s
believing that p) and the reason for the action (p) can fall under the term, which
suggests that ‘reason’ refers to an entity which both causes and rationalises the
action as long as the ambiguity remains unresolved. Thus, calling beliefs and desires
themselves ‘reasons’ might be said to be harmless as long as it is not taken to mean
that the agent’s reason for doing something was that she believed that p or that
she desired that q. It is the proposition or content believed or desired that is the
agent’s reason, but in order to have that reason, the agent has to have a propositional
attitude towards that proposition or content.
This ambiguity also makes it anything but clear whether Davidson is as far
removed fromWittgenstein in this respect as the tradition he influenced. While
Davidson calls beliefs and desires themselves ‘reasons’, it has been suggested89 that
he uses the term in the sense inwhich beliefs and desires are reasons had or possessed
by the agent. On such a reading, the item that causes and the item that rationalises
would fall apart after all. Some passages in Davidson’s later writings support this
reading, for instance when he speaks of the ‘difficulty of transmuting a cause into
87 HenryHabberleyPrice, ’Self-VerifyingBeliefs’,Belief (London:GeorgeAllen andUnwin,1969),
362.
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a reason’90 and of the fact that ‘even if our reasons for our beliefs are always other
beliefs, the causes sometimes lie elsewhere’.91
When the ambiguity between state and content is resolved, the item that ration-
alises and the item that causes usually fall apart. This is not to deny that in some
cases, the item that rationalises an action is nothing other than the agent’s believing
that p. But this gerundial construction does not provide a counterexample to the
state-content dichotomy. Rather, it can be understood as a nominalisation referring
to a fact about the agent, namely that she believes that p. To borrow an example
from JohnHyman:92mybelieving that I am being followed by the Security Services
is a reason forme to see a doctor. If I go on to see a doctor,what justifiesmy action is
a fact aboutme, namely that I believe I am being followed. On this view, facts about
the psychology of agents are not to be identified with reasons across the board, but
are rather a special subset of all the objective features of the world that can weigh in
on one’s reasoning.
In deliberating about what to do, the reasons that inform and guide our choices
are typically not mental states or events, but aspects of situations. These can include
mental states or events, but they are not restricted to them. Any putative fact, be it
ever so distal, can act as a reason, while it is the agent’s attending to or acknowledging
the fact, and thus some process internal to the agent, the neurophysiological realisa-
tion of which need not be known to him or her, which acts as the proximal cause
of the action.
Another streak of anti-psychologism is discernible inWittgenstein’s insistence
on the distinction between the object and the cause of a mental state:
On being asked for the reasons for a supposition, one calls them to mind. Does the same
thing happen here as when one considers what may have been the causes of an event?
A distinction should be made between the object of fear and the cause of fear. So a face
which inspires fear or delight (the object of fear or delight) is not on that account its cause,
but – one might say – its target.93
One should distinguish what one is afraid of, namely some object which, if suitably
described, yields reasons for fear, from the cause of one’s fear.94 This distinction
closely parallels that between cause and reason:
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If I fear something it doesn’t mean ‘I feel jittery, is it his face? Take it away and see if I still
feel jittery’. Similarly with delight. The expression of fear or delight contains an object. . . .
Giving the motive of an action is like stating the object of fear or delight.95
Comparing the statement of the object of fear with the statement of a reason or
motive makes sense, given the parallels between the reason-cause dichotomy and
the object-cause dichotomy: both the object and the cause of fear can bementioned
in answer to the question ‘Why is A afraid?’, and the object can be adduced to
justify the fear, though it will do so only under certain descriptions.
The distinction aimed at in these passages is that between, on the one hand, the
objective features of the world that come to have significance for us as the bearers
of value and meaning and guide the course of our actions by providing reasons for
or against them, and, on other hand, the causal basis by which we come to exper-
ience those objective features in the way that we do. The confusion between the
two is tempting because there is a sense in which this causal basis is the ultimate
support of those values and meanings. It is this confusion which is expressed in the
bumper sticker claim that ‘Technically, there are only two thingswe enjoy: serotonin
and dopamine’, or when it is inferred from the claim that ‘All ethical value rests in
people’s dispositions’ that ‘The only things of value are people’s dispositions’. In
both cases, one mistakes the causal basis of our enjoyment or of our ethical values
with their objects.
While illuminating in itself, Wittgenstein’s distinction between the causes and
the objects of mental states further ramifies his anti-psychologism about reasons.
Reasons are typically neither mental states of believing or desiring, nor what causes
them, but what is believed or what is desired. Reasons, on this view, can rationalise
at a distance.
5. Failure to Justify
Closely related toWittgenstein’s anti-psychologism is another argumentative strand
according to which the assimilation of reasons to the realm of causes fails in virtue
of the requirement on reasons to justify the proposition and actions they are reasons
for:
The attending to the rule can indeed be the cause for the rule being followed. . . . [Yet] the
cause of an action can never be referred to, to justify the action. I may justify a calculation
by appealing to the laws of arithmetic, but not by appealing to my attending to these laws.
The one is a justification, the other a causal explanation.96
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The point here is not that reasons cannot be causes because causes explain while
reasons justify. OnWittgenstein’s own externalist conception of causality, according
to which causal relations obtain between logically independent events,97 this would
be a non sequitur; causes can be referred to in justifications, since a causal relation
can hold between events even though the events are referred to under descriptions
linking them in a justificatory relationship. WhenWaismann writes that ‘the cause
of an action can never be referred to, to justify the action’, the point is that typically,
the proximal cause of an action is not referred to in order to justify that very action.
The requirement on reasons for action to serve as justifications for the action dis-
qualifiesmental states, such as the agent’s attending to a rule, frombeing at the same
time the reasons for the action, although theymay play a causal role in it. Moreover,
‘the causemight lie also in something quite different’, such as a ‘habit’ or a ‘reflex’.98
Waismann gives an example:
Let us suppose a train driver sees a red signal flashing and brings the train to a stop. In
response to the question: ‘Why did you stop?’, he answers perhaps: ‘Because the signal says
to stop here’. One wrongly regards this statement as the specification of a cause whereas it
is the specification of a reason. The cause may have been that he was long accustomed to
reacting to the red signal in such-and-such a way or that in his nervous system permanent
connections of pathways developed such that the action follows the stimulus in themanner
of a reflex or yet something else. The cause need not be known to him. By contrast, the
reason is what he specifies. He answers with a rule.99
The rule ‘If the signal is red, then stop’, together with the fact that its antecedent is
fulfilled, justifies the action, while ‘giving the cause of his action would not justify
it’.100 Any actually performed transition from one proposition to another, or from
thought to action, has a causal basis, a physiological realisation. Yet what justifies
the transition is not that causal basis, but the normative and factual considerations
that make the transition correct or incorrect. And while the agent needs to be aware
of the rule in order to count as following it – an awareness which might figure in a
causal account of the action – it is not the awareness of the rule, but only the rule
itself which can justify the action. This is the act-object ambiguity in the expression
‘to follow a rule’ highlighted inWaismann’s notes: ‘Reason and cause correspond
to the two meanings of the expression ‘to follow a rule’.101 To the extent that the
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agent attends to the rules, the rules could be said to impinge on the causal order.
Rules (and reasons generally) impinge on the causal order by altering our attitudes
as they should be altered according to the normative relations that these rules and
reasons stand in. But while these attitudes are part of what causes actions, they are
not typically what justifies them.
6. Conclusion
In this paper, I have argued that Wittgenstein is classified as an anti-causalist about
reasons in large part for reasons that have little to dowith his arguments against CR.
I have argued further that Wittgenstein offers distinctive arguments to the effect
that reasons cannot simply be equated with, or subsumed as a species of, causes:
reasons are subject to certainty and to first-person authority in a way which causes
cannotmatch; reasons are typically neither physiological processes normental states,
but what our mental states are about, which makes them unlikely candidates for
causes of action; and reasons justify where causes could not. I have also indicated
that Wittgenstein anticipates current anti-psychologistic trends in the theory of
action.
However, Wittgenstein’s arguments all bear primarily on causalism about reas-
ons (CR), and not on causalism about intentional explanation (CE). Where he
does speak about intentional explanation, he emphasises that a key characteristic
of intentional explanations which is alien to the causal explanations of physics is
that they refer to rule-governed practices and institutions, and thus to the agents’
local perspectives and idiosyncrasies. To regard bodily movements not under their
mechanical aspect, but under their aspect as reason-guided actions – as the signing
of a cheque, for example – involves viewing them in the context of rule-governed
practices and institutions.102Absent these customs and institutions, nothingwould
count as performing these actions, no matter what went on in the mind or brain of
the agent.103
Yet even granted this difference, it does not follow that intentional explanations
cannot be a sui generis form of causal explanation. Wittgenstein can be read as
being in agreement here with his presumed nemesis Davidson, who acknowledges
that ‘there is an irreducible difference between psychological explanations that
102 FriedrichWaismann, The Principles of Linguistic Philosophy (London: Macmillan, 1965), 124;
Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations (Chichester, U.K.: Wiley-Blackwell, 2009),
§§197–99.
103 P.M. S. Hacker, ’Wittgenstein and the Autonomy ofHumanistic Understanding’,Wittgenstein,
Theory and the Arts, Richard Allen andMalcolm Turvey (eds.), (London: Routledge, 2011),
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involve the propositional attitudes and explanation in sciences like physics and
physiology’,104 and who endorses R. G. Collingwood’s view that ‘the methodology
of history (or, for that matter, of any of the social sciences that treat individual hu-
man behaviour) differs markedly from the methodology of the natural sciences’.105
Davidson also maintains that ‘[b]eliefs and intentions are not little entities lodged
in the brain’,106 but attitudes we ascribe to a person as a whole, and ‘since beliefs
and desires aren’t entities, it is a metaphor to speak of their changing, and hence an
extension of thatmetaphor to speak of them as causes and effects’.107What changes,
according to Davidson, are ‘the descriptions of the agent . . . over time’.108
All this suggests that Davidson might well be closer to Wittgenstein than to
the contemporary standard story he inspired.109 At the heart of this standard story,
after all, is the claim that reasons are causes because reasons are inner states or events.
If Davidson rejects this claim, he hasmuch in common in the causalism debate with
Wittgenstein, since, as I hope to have shown in this paper, it is whenWittgenstein’s
thought is directed against this hypostatisation of reasons as ‘little entities lodged
in the brain’ that its contemporary relevance for anti-causalism comes most sharply
into focus.
104 Donald Davidson, Problems of Rationality (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2004), 101.
105 Donald Davidson, Truth, Language, and History (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2005), 285.
106 Donald Davidson, ’Replies’, The Philosophy of Donald Davidson, L. E. Hahn (ed.), (La Salle:
Open Court, 1999), 654.
107 Ibid.
108 Ibid., 655.
109 See Frederick Stoutland, ’Reasons and Causes’,Wittgenstein: Mind, Meaning and Metaph-
ilosophy (New York: PalgraveMacmillan, 2010), 60; Hans-Johann Glock, ’Reasons for Action:
Wittgensteinian andDavidsonian Perspectives in Historical, Meta-Philosophical and Philosoph-
ical Context’,Nordic Wittgenstein Review 3 (2014), 7–46.
